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Abstract—Deep Learning (DL) techniques are now widespread
and being integrated into many important systems. Their clas-
sification and recognition abilities ensure their relevance for
multiple application domains. As machine-learning that relies
on training instead of algorithm programming, they offer a high
degree of productivity. But they can be vulnerable to attacks
and the verification of their correctness is only just emerging
as a scientific and engineering possibility. This paper is a major
update of a previously-published survey, attempting to cover all
recent publications in this area. It also covers an even more
recent trend, namely the design of domain-specific languages for
producing and training neural nets.
I. INTRODUCTION
As research unit of a leading vendor of information and
communication systems, Huawei’s Central Software Institute
(CSI) is developing high-performance deep learning (DL)
systems for image classification [1] and other image recog-
nition functions. In application domains like self-driving cars
[2], correct operation (safety) and attack resistance (secu-
rity) of DL systems has become critical. The engineering
of neural networks (NN) is less well understood than for
general software: despite a relatively static and clean structure,
their functionality depends on numerical parameters that are
extracted from ad-hoc datasets and complex hand-made layer
topologies built from signal-processing operators and treshold
or ”activation” nodes. As a result, a neural network’s behavior
depends mostly on its numerical values, and its use in embed-
ded systems is not amenable to verification by control-flow.
A ray of hope in this bleak outlook, recent research has
found a partial substitute to full NN specification and ver-
ification in the form of novel stability analysis techniques.
Such techniques ensure that a small change in input (image,
sound or pattern) produces a negligible change in output e.g.
no change in the embedded system’s behavior. Several groups
have shown how to adapt model checking for this purpose,
others have designed special-purpose linear solvers for it,
and the computational feasibility of this analysis has been
improving. It remains to see whether trust in NN inference
will reach the level required of safety-critical applications. But
a clear trend has been set to improve the understanding and
engineering of this very popular type of machine learning.
This paper is a major update of a previously-published
survey [3], attempting to cover all recent publications in this
area. Research on safety of DL had produced two papers per
year in the period 2003-2014. We then found three directly-
relevant publications in 2015, seven in 2016, sixteen in 2017
and a relative slowdown with 9 publications in 2018. This peek
corresponds with the arrival and proof-of-concept for feasi-
ble static verification of NN stability, hence their protection
against so-called adversarial attacks. Our survey also covers a
few papers on an even more recent trend, namely the design
of programming languages for producing and training neural
nets. The work covered constitutes in our opinion the first
generation of tools for neural network software engineering.
The next sections survey existing work on
• Attacks against DL systems
• Testing, training and monitoring DL systems for safety
• The verification of DL systems
Then we survey recent work and propose new work in the
design of programming tools for DL.
II. SECURITY: ATTACKS AND THEIR PREVENTION
An adversarial example for a NN classifier is a slightly
perturbed input that generates a different, hence wrong, classi-
fication from the desired one. In recent years many have been
identified and specific solutions designed for each one. But the
general problem remains of formally guaranteeing in advance
the absence of adversarial example.
Carlini et al.’s paper [4] is motivated in this manner by
safety-security (absence of accidental or intentional adversarial
examples) and the need to verify it. They introduce the notion
of a ground truth, or adversarial example with minimal change
in input value. This is useful for two things: judging the
quality of an attack by comparing it to the ground truth, and
judging the quality of a defence by the amount it increases
the distortion in the new ground truth.
The authors of [5] present and articulate technical arguments
that appear to show that intentional adversarial examples can
be countered, in the area of image processing, by a kind
of “multi-sensor” approach. Like attacks on face recognition
can be countered by 3D or multiple-angle 2D images, ad-
versarial examples would become ineffective in the presence
of multiple-angle or time-sequenced images of the same
object(s).
III. TESTING, TRAINING AND MONITORING FOR
SAFETY
Concrete progress has been made by authors who propose
to adapt training and testing with specific safety-conscious
properties and techniques.
The survey paper by B. Taylor et al. [6] takes a very general
human-level definition of AI safety. It defines eight very
challenging wanted properties of machine learning systems
like NN but most of them relate to the human application
of DL systems so, in our opinion, they are premature to
consider before the science and engineering of DL becomes
more mature. One of their eight properties is more amenable
to purely technical developments “ inductive ambiguity identi-
fication” with special case “active learning”. An active learner
can interact with humans during its learning phase so as to
ask them for additional data (e.g. images) that would break
some automatically detected ambiguity in classification. Active
learning can thus be considered a design goal for improving
the safety of DL systems.
The authors of [7] consider the application of an (unrelated)
automatic testing tool called DeepTest to self-driving cars.
It can be considered an elementary but meaningful tool for
structured testing. As such it has the advantages and limitations
of testing methods: easy to design and implement, incomplete
by design.
Leofante, Pulina and Tacchella [8] present recent work
in the definition and verification of machine-learning safety,
namely the guarantee that the input-output function defined
by a trained system will behave “ according to specifica-
tion”. They also quote model-checking results for verifying
this property, its computational costs but do not detail the
methodology for doing this. Their notion of global correctness
is based on stability: limited input sample variations lead to
limited output variations. This is a well-defined and apparently
verifiable type of specification, but it does open two related
and deep questions: how can designers be certain that their
reference datasets are in some sense correct and complete?
How to choose the metric that measures the input or output
variations? The notion of active learning, presented in [6]
could lead to a practical solution to the first question. But the
general problem of global correctness certainly needs more
powerful mathematical tools than stability theory: NNs must
interact with general algorithms, if only for such operations as
sorting results, and the whole system’s correct and complete
specification is thus a classical pre-condition, post-condition
pair of local expressions on the system state. In the (very
common) application area of image processing NN-specific
predicates could specify that image recognition is, for example
rotation invariant. To the best of our knowledge this problem
of mixing signal-processing with software specification is
unexplored. Stability predicates would then be an important
but incomplete tool to ensure system correctness.
Wicker, Huang and Kwiatkowska [9] present a sophisticated
approach that allows black-box testing of NNs i.e. with con-
sideration of features being detected but ignorance of the NN’s
structure. They search a game space where an agent adversary
attempts to use normally/fool/randomly use the detection of
features. The method is considered competitive with white-
box methods.
Yerramalla, Mladenovski and Fuller [10] applies continuous
control theory to design a monitor for ensuring that “unstable”
learning can be detected. Their notion of stability is specific
to an application where a fixed dataset of images is replaced
by an airplane’s onboard NN that is trained dynamically
through in-flight cameras. This work can be considered as
mathematical support for dynamically generated datasets, or
abstractly: dynamically generated specifications for the DL
system.
Wu et al. [11] proposed a two-player turn-based game
framework for the verification of deep neural networks with
provable guarantees, and to evaluate pointwise robustness
of neural networks in safety-critical applications such as
traffic sign recognition in self-driving cars. They developed a
software tool DeepGame, and demonstrated its applicability
on networks and dataset benchmarks.
Gehr et al. [12] present AI2 a scalable analyzer for deep
neural networks, a system able to certify convolutional and
large fully connected networks. Based on over approximation,
AI2 can automatically prove safety properties (e.g., robustness)
of realistic neural networks (e.g., convolutional neural
networks) with an extensive evaluation on 20 neural networks.
Black and Ribeiro [13] developed the Ockham Sound
Analysis Criteria to recognize static analyzers whose findings
are always correct. In Static Analysis Tool Exposition (SATE)
V, only one tool was reviewed.
Georgakis et al. [14] investigated the ability of using
synthetically generated composite images for training state-
of-the-art object detectors, especially for object instance
detection. They superimpose 2D images of textured object
models into images of real environments at variety of
locations and scales. They demonstrate the effectiveness
of these object detector training strategies on two publicly
available datasets, the GMUKitchens [15] and the Washington
RGB-D Scenes v2 [16].
Hinterstoisser, Lepetit and Wohlhart [17] demonstrated how
to train effectively modern object detectors with synthetic
images only. They “freeze” the layers responsible for feature
extraction to generic layers pre-trained on real images, and
train only the remaining layers with plain OpenGL rendering.
They have shown that by freezing a pre-trained feature
extractor they are able to train state-of-the-art object detectors
on synthetic data only, and freezing the feature extractor
gives a huge performance boost.
Jang, Wu and Jha [18] focused on attacks by adversarial
perturbation. They present a simple gradient-descent based al-
gorithm for finding adversarial perturbations, which performs
well in comparison to existing algorithms. They present a
novel metric based on computer-vision algorithms for quanti-
fying the difference between an image and its perturbation.
Leofante et al. [19] propose an automated reasoning tech-
nique and a comprehensive categorization of existing ap-
proaches for the automated verification of neural networks. In
their opinion the automated verification of NNs could be the
new driving force for theoretical and practical advancements in
Automated Reasoning and, at the same time, ML could benefit
from powerful verification techniques to generate proofs of
correctness for NNs.
But again, testing is by design an incomplete approach and
the “specification” of a DL system relies on the experimental
definition of its training dataset.
IV. VERIFICATION AND SIMULATION
Other authors have investigated formal and even automatic
methods for safety verification. This line of research has been
accelerating in recent years.
Broderick [20] uses simulation in the area of flight on-board
online-learning NNs. It does not take a formal approach to ver-
ification but applies statistical techniques. The white paper [21]
defines high-level requirements for “formal” (mathematically-
based) verification of similar systems from the point of view
of control theory.
Fuller, Yerramalla and Cukic [22] model the learning of
a NN as a dynamical system where training adjustments are
discrete differential equations on the states that are neurons
and weights. Lyapunov stability analysis is then applicable to
detect stable states in the dynamical system. Stability in this
theory thus amounts to the absence of adversarial examples. It
is shown how to apply this concept to (shallow) NNs of fixed
topology and also to dynamic ones.
Survey paper [23] compares methods for verifying NNs
with piecewise linear structures. It compares methods based
on SMT solvers, mixed integer programming and a new
branch-and-bound method. The tools are able to verify 100-
500 properties for networks for 2-6 layers. Correctness is
defined as a form of stability and verification, in theory
exhaustive testing, is accelerated by assuming piecewise-linear
state spaces.
Katz et al. [24], [25] treat Rectified Linear Units-based
(ReLU) NN systems. The NN system and a domain specific
safety specification is modelled as an SMT formula. The
system is verified using a version of the simplex algorithm
modified to handle the non-linearities introduced by the ReLU-
functions. However, their use-case has a well-defined safety
specification, which is not the case in other domains such as
image recognition. Furthermore, scalability is a concern for
this technique.
Cheng, Nu¨hrenberg and Ruess [26] verify DNNs by trans-
lating non-linear (input-output) constraints generated by ReLU
activation functions using big-M encoding. Then standard
techniques for linear optimization are applied to verification.
In [27], an optimization technique is proposed to accelerate
verification problems that are difficult for SMT and ILP
solvers. It assumes so-called feed-forward NNs that allow
the addition of a global linear approximation of the overall
network behavior.
Blog entry [28] is a general discussion of the importance
of safety for DL systems, with arguments in favour of formal
verification as opposed to testing.
Huang et al. [29] present SMT-based work on verifying
the absence of adversarial inputs in Feed- forward multi-
layer neural networks. The paper contains many convincing
examples of such perturbed images. The verification method
finds adversarial inputs, if they exist, for a given region and a
family of manipulations.
Katz et al. published in [30] their efforts to prove adversarial
robustness of NNs. They propose a new notion of ”global
robustness” quantifying the robustness of a DNN. Intuitively,
a network is globally robust if any two neighbours in the input
are also neighbors in the output. Robustness is thus a non-limit
form of continuity as in:
d1(x, y) ≤ δ −→ d2(NN(x), NN(y)) ≤ ε
where NN is the neural net’s inference function, d1 is a
standard metric in the input domain, d2 a suitable metric in the
output domain and δ, ε are experimentally chosen error bounds
where ε could be zero, e.g. if the output is a discrete space
of features. They then show how to encode this property and
verify it using Reluplex. However, it is challenging to verify,
and the result only extends to DNN with a few dozen nodes.
Narodytask et al. [31] present the first exact Boolean
representation of a deep NN so that a binarized network is
faithfully represented as a Boolean formula. They are then
able to leverage the high efficiency of modern SAT solvers
for the formal and automatic verification of the NNs behavior,
in particular resistance to adversarial perturbations.
Pulina and Tacchella [32] present CETAR: a Counter-
Example Triggered Abstract Refinement verification approach
for DNNs. Performance is not demonstrated on large NNs
(only 20 nodes are used).
Paper [33] by the same authors describes and evaluates the
tool NeVeR that verifies the safety of ANNs by encoding them
as SMT-formula with linear inequalities. Furthermore, to im-
prove scalability, the authors apply the abstraction refinement
scheme presented in their earlier work.
Xiang, Tran and Johnson [34] present a verification method
for multi-layer NNs and apply it to robotics. Their simulation-
based method for the estimation of the output set of a NN
is applicable to networks with monotone activation functions.
The verification problem is formulated and solved as a chain
of optimization problems for estimating the output-range.
Dutta et al. [35] also study the automatic estimation of the
output-range for deep NNs. A key concept of theirs is that
sets of possible inputs are compactly represented by convex
polyhedral. They compute the guaranteed output range for
DNNs by successive optimizations.
Baufreton et al. in 2010 [36] presented an analysis of safety
standards and their implementation in certification strategies
from different domains such as aeronautics, automation,
automotive, nuclear, railway and space (performed in the
context of the CG2E — ”Club des Grandes Entreprises
de l’Embarque´”). All the covered domains agree upon the
articulation of a deterministic view of software and the
system safety goals, including the probabilistic ones. The
regulation regime and certification scheme is similar for
aviation, nuclear and, to some extent, railway and space, but
significantly different for automation and automotive.
Blanquart et al. in 2012 [37] presented a comparative
analysis across several industrial domains, of the fundamental
notion of safety categories or levels (Safety Integrity Levels,
Development Assurance Levels, etc.) underlying the safety
framework enforced by safety standards, gathering experts
from 6 industrial domains (automotive, aviation, industrial
automation, nuclear, railway and space). They have shown
that the various schemes are not fundamentally different,
and could be seen as various instances of a single consistent
scheme.
In the same 2012 Machrouh et al. presented an analysis
of the impact of the Development Assurance Level (DAL)
or Safety Integrity Level (SIL) on the system activities in
various application domains represented in the CG2E and
specially on the dependability, safety norms and standards
working group. They analyzed the impact in each application
domain, and identified and discussed the similarities and the
dissimilarities in order to find the cross domain synergies.
Ledinot et al. in [38] compares the influence of
Development Assurance Levels (DALs) of six different
software development assurance standards for civil aviation,
automotive, space, process automation, nuclear and railway.
They observed significant cross-domain differences to
minimize the risk of residual software development or
verification errors. They found, that the discrepancies
between the six standards in planning, in rules and standards,
in structural coverage or verification independency etc. are
not a matter of degree. Some major discrepancies are a matter
of principles: definition of requirements vs. requirement of
definitions, modulation of activities vs. modulation of means.
Seshia, Sadigh and Sastry [39] analyzed the challenge
of formally verifying systems that use artificial intelligence
or machine learning. They identified five main challenges:
environment modeling, formal specification, system modeling,
computational engines, and correct-by-construction design.
They are applying the developed theory to the design of human
cyber-physical systems [40] and learning-based cyberphysical
systems, with a special focus on autonomous and semi-
autonomous vehicles.
In 2014, Ledinot et al. [41] discussed different approaches
to combining formal methods (FM) and testing in the
safety standards of the automotive, aeronautic, nuclear,
process, railway and space industries. They concluded that
Railway, Aeronautics, and to some extent Nuclear, are
the three industrial domains where using formal methods,
alone or jointly with testing, is effective in production
software development. In case of joint use, three modes
of combination may be considered, depending on whether
one partitions, substitutes or intertwines the two verification
means. Alternative and more direct means to address detection
of unintended functions have been proposed formal methos
(FM) verification of the specification, double independent
specification, and enhanced exploratory testing in this paper.
Then in 2016 [42] the authors propose a global rationale
combining probabilistic evidence on hardware random failures
and deterministic evidence on systematic causes of failures
including software. They reject, for ultrahigh reliability
software, a move towards more statistical assessment against
less development assurance.
In the Best Paper of the ERTS2 2018 [43] the authors
proposed a description of classical software safety analysis
techniques, and discussed why software complexity increase
has progressively made completeness of system functional
safety requirements an important issue. They stress that
extrapolating system or hardware analysis techniques such
as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) to software
is unlikely to provide meaningful results, considering that
the underlying assumptions such as the fault model do
not apply to software. However, techniques such as SEEA
(Software Error Effect Analysis) may provide some support
to robustness analysis. The proper development of pieces
of software needs the generalization of techniques such
as contract-based design with compositional verification,
consistent safety invariants at all design levels, and a more
control-oriented approach to safety.
Ruan, Huang and Kwiatkowska [44] show how to obtain
the safety verification problem, the output range analysis
problem and a robustness measure by instantiating the
reachability problem. They present a novel algorithm based
on adaptive nested optimisation to solve the reachability
problem. The technique has been implemented and evaluated
on a range of deep neural networks (DNNs), demonstrating
its efficiency, scalability and ability to handle a broader class
of networks than state-of-the-art verification approaches.
V. SPECIFICATION AND FUTURE SOFTWARE
TOOLS
The above set of research results indicate a strong con-
vergence towards automatic and formally-based methods for
verifying the input-output behavior of DL systems. But a
serious problem appears to remain in balancing the guarantees
of exhaustive search as in model checking with reasonable
compute times. This situation is familiar to users of linear
solvers and indeed several authors use linear equations and
solvers to tackle DL safety problems.
J. Taylor et al.’s paper [45] discusses in a very high-level
way the problem of specifying the behavior of a machine-
learning system for example through the objective function
of its training phase. It covers an interesting set of research
targets one of whom has specific meaning for specification
of DL system behavior. Inductive ambiguity identification is
defined as the goal of creating systems that can detect inputs
for which their inference or classification would be highly
under-determined by training data. Future safety-verification
methods should address this problem that is akin to the need
for attaching confidence levels to DL-system outputs.
Foerster et al. [46] present a very innovative approach
where the NNs come from a specific sub-family: without
nonlinearities or input-dependent recurrent weights. For this
family the linear representation of input-output behavior is
not an approximation but an exact encoding. As a result
verification can benefit from fast linear-algebra operations.
The balance between this restricted family of NNs and their
expressive power is illustrated on a very large NLP example.
This approach could either become a breakthrough or a less
significant approach for niche applications. But the general
idea of a compact and efficiently-processed specification has
been demonstrated.
The white paper by Russel, Dewey and Tegmark [47]
reasserts, among many other things, that formal verification
and security and absolute necessities for all AI systems.
They propose that AI systems (among them DL systems)
should allow the verification of their behavior, of their designs
(in particular their specification) , allow how to distinguish
their software-hardware components, and also the modular
verification of their parts.
Cheng et al. [48] presents the open-source toolbox nn-
dependability-kit to support data- driven engineering of neural
networks for safety-critical domains. They provide evidence
of uncertainty reduction in key phases of the product life
cycle, ranging from data collection, training & validation,
testing & generalization, to operation. The application of
Gaussian noise changed the result of classification, where the
confidence of being ”end of no overtaking zone” has dropped
from the originally identified 100% to 16.6%.
Kulkarni et al. [49] present Picture, a probabilistic
programming language for scene understanding that allows
researchers to express complex generative vision models,
while automatically solving them using fast general-purpose
inference machinery. Picture provides a stochastic scene
language that can express generative models for arbitrary
2D/3D scenes, as well as a hierarchy of representation layers
for comparing scene hypotheses with observed images by
matching not simply pixels, but also more abstract features
(e.g., contours, deep neural network activations). Such a
language certainly improves programming productivity but
its improvement of safety or verification remains to be seen.
A last recent line of research is the design of domain-
specific programming languages (DSLs) that provide a white-
box view of predefined NN libraries and frameworks. They
allow users to write explicit and portable code for neural-net
layers, their topology (data-dependencies) and allow the com-
piler writers to concentrate on optimizations and architecture
models. The publications we cite here are only a few early
examples of this research and we cannot be exhaustive about
it at the time of writing this survey (2019Q1).
A team from NVIDIA has presented its Diesel DSL [50]
specifically designed for producing efficient neural net im-
plementations. The input Diesel program specifies a single-
assignment set of arrays and data dependencies. It is compiled
to a polyhedral intermediate representation allowing static
data-size inference, layer (loop) fusions and tiling among other
optimizations.
In the context of the TVM software framework, another
team has developed the Relay DSL [51] with even more
ambitious language features to facilitate NN programming. It
features a Python front-end for developers using that popular
language, but more importantly: dependent types for tensor
shapes, a TVM-integrated compiler, runtime optimizations and
a module for automatic differentiation of programs. This last
features is a the core of NN training procedures where a
neural net’s inference (execution) needs to be differentiated
with respect to its error function. Training has previously
been a mostly black-box operation from the point of view
of source code. Training can now become explicit and source-
code driven, thus lifting the effect of training to a province of
programming language semantics.
It should be hoped that program verification techniques will
also evolve to make use of the precise semantics that can be
attached to DSL operations.
Among other research sub-directions that are completely
open one can list:
• A DSL sub-language defining the distance function that
is the basis for defining perturbations.
• Tools that translate those DSLs into low-level specifi-
cations for given datasets, including tools to compare
datasets, analyze them for their distance-function statis-
tics etc.
• UML class diagrams for representing datasets, others for
replacing the DSLs in industrial applications.
• Theorem-proving techniques are still far in the future
because they require a clear logical specification of what
a neural network’s inference computes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Safety of DL systems is a serious requirement for real-
life systems and the research community is addressing this
need with mathematically-sound but low-level methods that
guarantee inference stability. But even when satisfactory and
feasible, such a verification only guarantees that the original
behavior of the given NN is unchanged from its training. Yet
there are no verifiable guarantees that this is in itself correct
and complete for lack of a specification.
To turn DL system design into a broad industry, methods
inspired by software engineering must be applied to comple-
ment current techniques.
Our survey of the area has shown the acceleration of the
line of work, the general agreement for its mathematical and
low-level methods and their relative success as a first step in
this direction.
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